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JURISDICTION 
 Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a) this Court has appellate 
jurisdiction over a judgment of the Utah Court of Appeals. Further, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(5), the Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear this appeal 
in an order dated July 6, 2016.   
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW  
 
Issue 1: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding Petitioner’s suit must be 
dismissed for failure to bring its subrogation action in the name of its insured.   
 Standard of Review: “On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of 
appeals, not the decision of the trial court. In doing so, this court adopts the same 
standard of review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for 
correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous.” 
State v. Harmon, 910 P. 2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995) (citing Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 
97, 101 n.2 (Utah 1992).  
 Interpretation of statutes and decisional precedents are reviewed for correctness. 
See MacFarlane v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2006 UT 25, ¶ 9, 134 P.3d 1116 (“A matter 
of statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review on appeal for correctness.” 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); see also In re Adoption of A.F.K., 2009 
UT App 198, ¶ 16, 216 P.3d 980 (explaining that “issues that require interpretation of 
prior decisional precedents” are “questions of law that are reviewed for correctness” 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
 2 
 
 Preservation in Record: This issue was preserved at numerous points before the 
trial court, including R. at 457–75; R. at 821.1 This issue also arose when the Utah Court 
of Appeals rendered its decision on February 25, 2015. Petitioner requested certiorari to 
hear this issue on March 24, 2016. Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 18–19. The statement of this 
issue is taken verbatim from this Courts’ order granting certiorari on July 6, 2016. 
Issue 2: Whether Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provided an alternative 
to dismissal of Petitioner’s complaint.   
 Standard of Review: “On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of 
appeals, not the decision of the trial court. In doing so, this court adopts the same 
standard of review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for 
correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous.” 
Harmon, 910 P. 2d at 1199. 
  “[T]he interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law that we review for 
correctness.” Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, ¶ 15, 16 P.3d 540. 
 Preservation in Record: This issue arose when the Utah Court of Appeals 
rendered its decision on February 25, 2015. Petitioner requested certiorari to hear this 
issue on March 24, 2016. Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 18–19. The statement of this issue is 
taken verbatim from this Courts’ order granting certiorari on July 6, 2016. 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
                                              
1
 In this brief, the court record of pleadings and papers shall be referred to as “R. page 
number.” 
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STATUTES: 
Utah Code Annotated Section § 31A-21-108: Subrogation actions 
 
Subrogation actions may be brought by the insurer in the name of its 
insured.  
 
RULES: 
 
Rule 17 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (in relevant part):  
 
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of 
the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, 
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract 
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute 
may sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose benefit 
the action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use 
or benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No 
action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name 
of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after 
objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or 
substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or 
substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced 
in the name of the real party in interest. 
   
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Appellant/Petitioner, Educators Mutual Insurance Association (“EMIA”), appeals 
the Utah Court of Appeals’ opinion Wilson v. Educators Mutual Insurance Association, 
2016 UT App 38, 368 P.3d 471. A true and correct copy of said opinion is attached 
hereto and hereby incorporated as Addend. A. Appellees/Respondents in this matter are 
Everett P. Wilson Jr. and Darla Wilson (“Wilsons”). The nature of this appeal focuses on 
whether an insurer has the right to bring a subrogation action in its own name or if the 
insurer must bring the action in the name of the insured. This appeal focuses secondarily 
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on the question of if an insurer must bring a subrogation action in the name of the 
insured, but the insurer instead brings the action in its own name, is dismissal of the 
subrogation claim required, or does Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provide an 
alternative to dismissal. 
 Jessica Wilson, an insured of EMIA, was struck by a car while crossing the road 
and passed away shortly thereafter from her injuries. R. at 571. EMIA paid for Jessica 
Wilson’s medical treatment. R. at 561. Jessica Wilson’s parents filed a wrongful death 
claim against the driver for burial expenses and compensation for loss of their daughter’s 
society, love, companionship, protection, and affection. R. at 570. EMIA filed a 
subrogation claim in its own name against the driver to recoup the expenses EMIA had 
paid for Jessica Wilson’s medical treatment following the accident. R. at 771–75. EMIA 
and Wilsons’ cases were consolidated. R. at 541. The liability insurance carrier for the 
tortfeasor interplead the driver’s policy limit—$100,000—to be allocated by the district 
court, and EMIA and the Wilsons released their claims against the driver. R. at 543. The 
district court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Regarding 
Allocation of Interpleader Amount Deposited with the Court (attached as Addend. B), 
allocating $24,182.31 to EMIA, and $75,817.69 to the Wilsons. R. at 844.   
Course of Proceedings/Disposition in the Lower Courts 
 EMIA filed a subrogation claim against the tortfeasor to recoup the expenses 
EMIA had paid for Jessica Wilson’s medical treatment following the accident. R. at 771–
75. The tortfeasor moved to dismiss EMIA’s claim, challenging EMIA’s standing to 
bring its suit. R. at 560–61. The district court entered an order (attached as Addend. C) 
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denying the motion to dismiss, adjudging that EMIA had standing to bring an action for 
subrogation under Utah’s Subrogation Statute, and to do so in its own name. R. at 821. 
EMIA and Wilsons’ cases were consolidated. R. at 541. The liability insurance carrier 
interplead the driver’s policy limit—$100,000—to be allocated by the court, and EMIA 
and the Wilsons released their claims against the driver. R. at 543.  
 The district court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
Regarding Allocation of Interpleader Amount Deposited with the Court, allocating 
$24,182.31 to EMIA, and $75,817.69 to the Wilsons. R. at 844. The Wilsons filed a 
Notice of Appeal on February 27, 2015. R. at 759. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102(4) the Utah Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Utah Court of Appeals on or 
about March 19, 2015. R. at 763.      
 After briefing and oral argument, the Utah Court of Appeals rendered its opinion 
on February 25, 2016. That opinion reversed the decision of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court on the basis that EMIA lacked standing to bring its subrogation claim against the 
tortfeasor in its own name, and remanded the matter with instructions that EMIA’s claims 
be dismissed. Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 13, 368 P.3d 471. Because the Utah Court of 
Appeals determined that EMIA lacked standing, the other issues presented by the 
Wilsons on appeal were not addressed directly in its opinion. Id. at ¶ 7. EMIA sought 
review of the Utah Court of Appeals’ decision, filing its Petition for Writ of Certiorari on 
March 24, 2016. Certiorari was granted by the Utah Supreme Court in an order dated July 
6, 2016.   
Statement of Facts 
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 On or about September 19, 2010, Jessica Wilson was walking in a crosswalk on 
the campus of Brigham Young University when she was struck by a car driven by Cade 
Krueger (the “tortfeasor”). R. at 571. Jessica Wilson was severely injured as a result and 
later passed away. Id. 
 At all times relevant to this matter, Jessica Wilson was insured through EMIA for 
medical expenses. R. at 843. The medical policy contains provisions and terms governing 
EMIA’s right to reimbursement and subrogation. R. at 624–25. See generally R. at 605–
85 (setting forth full medical policy). As a result of the automobile accident caused by the 
tortfeasor, EMIA paid medical expenses on behalf of Jessica Wilson in the amount of 
$78,692.34. R. at 772. 
 EMIA and the Wilsons filed separate claims against the tortfeasor; EMIA sued for 
reimbursement, including interest, of the medical expenses it paid in behalf of Jessica 
Wilson that were incurred when the tortfeasor’s vehicle struck her, and Wilsons sued the 
tortfeasor for the wrongful death of Jessica Wilson. R. at 843. 
 The tortfeasor filed a motion to dismiss EMIA’s suit, arguing that EMIA lacked 
standing to bring its suit. R. at 560–61 The district court entered an order denying the 
motion to dismiss, adjudging that EMIA had standing to bring an action for subrogation 
under Utah’s Subrogation Statute, and to do so in its own name. R. at 821. 
 The claims filed by EMIA and the Wilsons were consolidated and the parties 
stipulated to release and dismiss the tortfeasor from the lawsuit upon the tortfeasor 
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interpleading $100,000—the tortfeasor insurance liability policy limit—with the trial 
court. R. at 543, 841. 
 Upon weighing the equities between Wilsons and EMIA, the trial court ordered 
that Wilsons receive $75,817.69 of the interpleaded funds, while EMIA received 
$24,182.31. R. at 840–44. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT  
 The Utah Court of Appeals erred in concluding that EMIA lacked standing to 
pursue a subrogation action in its own name and in concluding that neither Utah’s 
subrogation statute nor Utah’s case law grant in insurer the right to pursue a subrogation 
action in its own name. Utah case law going back to the turn of the twentieth century 
clearly holds that a subrogating insurer is a real party in interest in a subrogation 
proceeding and may maintain its subrogation action in its own name. No case or statute 
has altered this real party in interest rule, and insurers continue to bring subrogation 
actions in either their own name or the name of their insured. Until the court of appeals 
decision in this matter, no Utah appellate court has questioned the insurer’s right to 
maintain a subrogation action in its own name in the last seventy years. 
 In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals relied heavily on the 1944 case, 
Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98 (Utah 1944). This reliance on Johanson is 
misplaced primarily because the portions of Johanson quoted by the court of appeals 
were not the law the Johanson Court adopted; the Johanson Court first analyzed the 
different positions taken by other states (including the portions quoted by the court of 
appeals) before adopting a completely contrary position. 
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 The court of appeals ignores several policy implications including how its decision 
would alter what losses an insurer is willing to cover, how insurers will likely be required 
to raise insurance premiums, and how the court of appeals’ decision would make it 
impossible for an insurer to recover in instances where an insured passes away from the 
actions or inactions of a tortfeasor. Also, while not central to the issues here on appeal, 
the court of appeals’ opinion includes problematic dicta concerning an heirs’ supposed 
superior right to reimbursement over an insurer when an insured passes away. This 
language, unless addressed, will likely cause confusion in future cases where insureds 
pass away from the actions or inactions of a tortfeasor. 
 Finally, even if the court of appeals was correct that an insurer cannot bring a 
subrogation action in its own name, the court of appeals was incorrect to dismiss EMIA’s 
action. Rather, Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides an alternative to 
dismissal.  
ARGUMENT 
THE DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD BE 
REVERSED BECAUSE ITS INTERPRETATION OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED § 31A-21-108 WAS INCORRECT, AND THE DECISION WAS 
CONTRARY TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 17 OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
 
As this Court has instructed, “On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of 
appeals, not the decision of the trial court. In doing so, this court adopts the same 
standard of review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for 
correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous.”  
State v. Harmon, 910 P. 2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995).  
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In this matter the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals should be reversed 
primarily for two reasons: (1) the Utah Court of Appeals’ interpretation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-21-108 was incorrect; and (2) even assuming that the Utah Court of Appeals’ 
interpretation was correct, remanding the matter to the trial court with instructions to 
dismiss EMIA’s claims was a violation of Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
I. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS’ INTERPRETATION OF § 31A-21-108 
WAS INCORRECT.   
  
 Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108 provides “[s]ubrogation actions may be brought by 
the insurer in the name of its insured.” The court of appeals held § 31A-21-108 does not 
give EMIA standing to bring a subrogation action in its own name. See Wilson, 2016 UT 
App 38, ¶ 8, 12, 368 P.3d 471. Interpretation of statutes and decisional precedents are 
reviewed for correctness. MacFarlane, 2006 UT 25, ¶ 9, 134 P.3d 1116; In re Adoption 
of A.F.K., 2009 UT App 198, ¶ 16, 216 P.3d 980. 
In this matter, the court of appeals’ construction of § 31A-21-108 is untenable for 
several reasons and its decision should be reversed. First, the manner in which the court 
of appeals interpreted the permissive “may” in § 31A-21-108 nullifies the effect of the 
statute because the right for an insurer to subrogate already exists at common law. 
Second, Utah case law illustrates that insurers regularly bring subrogation actions in their 
own names, and have before the enactment of § 31A-21-108. Third, the court of appeals 
misapplied Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98 (Utah 1944). Fourth, the 
manner in which the court of appeals interpreted § 31A-21-108 would make it impossible 
for an insurer to subrogate against a tortfeasor if the insured dies as a result of a 
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tortfeasor’s negligence. Fifth, the court of appeals’ interpretation of § 31A-21-108 creates 
serious policy issues. Finally, the court of appeals cited incorrectly to case law to support 
its proposition that heirs have a superior right of recovery.   
A. UNDER THE COURT OF APPEALS’ REASONING, THERE WOULD 
HAVE BEEN NO NEED TO ENACT § 31A-21-108. 
 
 The manner in which the court of appeals construed §31A-21-108 nullifies the 
effect of the statute and makes it meaningless. The court of appeals examined the 
common law to determine whether an insurer may bring a subrogation action in its own 
name, stating, “a suit at law to enforce such right of subrogation must, at common law, be 
brought in the name of the insured, rather than by the insurance company in its own name 
and right.” Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 10, 368 P.3d 471 (quoting Johanson, 152 P.2d at 
104). The court of appeals’ reliance on Johansen is misplaced for reasons that will be 
discussed in Section I(C) of this Brief. However, if the common law already allowed an 
insurer to bring a subrogation action in the name of the insured, as the court of appeals 
asserts, then there would have been no reason for the legislature to enact §31A-21-108, as 
under the court of appeals’ interpretation of the statue, its only effect is to allow insurers 
to bring a subrogation action in the name of an insured.  
B. A REVIEW OF UTAH’S SUBROGATION CASE LAW SHOWS THAT 
UNDER UTAH LAW THE SUBROGATING INSURER HAS LONG BEEN 
REGARDED AS A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST WITH A RIGHT TO 
BRING A SUBROGATION ACTION IN ITS OWN NAME. 
  
 The Utah Court of Appeals stated, “Our review of Utah case law convinces us that 
. . . no independent right exists for an insurer to seek subrogated damages in its own 
name.” Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 8, 368 P.3d 471. On the contrary, a review of Utah 
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case law shows that Utah has long recognized that the subrogating insurer is a real party 
in interest in a subrogation action and has the right to seek subrogated damages in its own 
name.   
 In 1913, National Union Fire Insurance Co. brought an action against a defendant 
railroad company on behalf of its insured. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver & R.G.R. 
Co., 44 Utah 26, 137 P. 653, 653 (1913). The defendant argued that because National 
Union had not reimbursed the insured for the full amount of the damages suffered (the 
insured had not been made whole), the insured maintained an interest in the claim and the 
claim should have been brought by the insured. Id. at 654. The Utah Supreme Court 
rejected this argument. Id. at 654–57. The supreme court noted that a subrogating insurer 
acts as an assignee and thus is a real party in interest with a right to bring an action in its 
own name, whether or not there is a formal assignment issued. See id. at 655–56. The 
Utah Supreme Court established this insurer as real party in interest rule reasoning that 
even if no formal assignment had been issued, an equitable assignment had still arisen. 
Id. The Utah Supreme Court explained: 
Not only does the [insurer as real party in interest] rule prevail when the 
assignment is absolute and complete and the assignee is the legal owner of 
the demand; it prevails with equal force in cases where the assignment is 
simply equitable in its character; and the assignee's title would not have 
been recognized in any form by a court of law under the old system but 
would have been purely equitable. Such assignee, being the real party in 
interest, must bring the action in his own name.  
 
Id. Thus, even if the insurer “only obtained an equitable or a qualified interest as 
contradistinguished from an absolute and unqualified interest, still . . . it was the real 
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party in interest, so far its interest extended, and the action could be commenced and 
maintained in its name.” Id. at 655. 
 In the 1938 case Baker v. Wycoff, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted then recent 
changes in Utah’s worker’s compensation statute to determine if a subrogating insurer 
has a legal right to maintain a subrogation action. 79 P.2d 77, 80 (1938). The legislation 
interpreted in Baker stated that an “insurance carrier having paid the compensation shall 
be subrogated to the rights of such employee or his dependents to recover against such 
third person.” Id. 80–81 (emphasis added). However, the statute did not explain how a 
subrogation action should be commenced, nor in whose name the action should be 
pursued. See id. The supreme court concluded that, while the injured employee originally 
had a valid cause of action, “[a]ny right of action he had [was then] passed, under the 
statute, to the insurance carrier, who was by law subrogated to the rights of the 
workman.” Id. at 81. Thus, the Utah Supreme Court held that a subrogating insurer is the 
real party in interest in a subrogation claim with ownership of the claim and a right to 
bring the claim in its own name. See id. 
 The supreme court later revisited this same subrogation statute in Johanson v. 
Cudahy Packing Co. to determine whether the insured, along with the subrogating 
insurer, is also a real party in interest. 152 P.2d 98 (1944).2 The supreme court seemed to 
agree with the proposition that if the insured has been made whole, the insured “would no 
longer have any interest in the cause of action,” and the insurer would remain the sole 
                                              
2
 Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co. will be analyzed in much greater detail below in 
Section I(C) of this Brief. 
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party in interest. Id. at 103. However, if the insurer has not paid the full amount of the 
loss suffered, the injured insured retains an interest in the action. Id. at 104. Under such 
circumstances, both the insurer (“as equitable assignees of the insured,” id. at 104) and 
the injured insured are “co–owners of the insured's right of action.” Id. at 104.  
 As the twentieth century progressed, the Utah Supreme Court continually 
recognized a subrogating insurer’s right to bring a subrogation action in its own name. In 
1969, the Supreme Court decided State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, 450 P.2d 458 (1969). In State Farm, the subrogating insurer 
brought a subrogation claim, in its own name, to recover for medical expenses it had paid 
on behalf of its insured. See State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 493 P.2d 
1002, 1002–03 (1972) (providing factual background for the 1969 case). The tortfeasor 
argued that under Utah law, insurers could not pursue personal injury subrogation claims. 
Id. The supreme court dismissed this argument, allowing insurers to bring personal injury 
subrogation claims in the insurer’s name. State Farm, 450 P.2d at 459.  
 In Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Barnes, Transamerica’s insured was involved in 
a car accident where a passenger in the insured’s car was injured. 505 P.2d 783 (Utah 
1972). Based on the insurance policy, Transamerica paid monies on behalf of the injured 
passenger. Transamerica notified the tortfeasor of its subrogation rights, but the tortfeasor 
sought to bypass the insurance company by settling with the injured party. Transamerica 
brought a subrogation action in its own name to enforce its subrogation rights. While 
Transamerica did not prevail, the Utah Supreme Court did not question whether or not 
Transamerica had standing to bring the subrogation action in its own name.  
 14 
 
 In Educators Mutual Insurance Association v. Allied Property & Casualty 
Insurance Co., Educators Mutual improperly pursued its subrogation rights through a 
fraud cause of action. 890 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1995). The Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
dismissing Educators Mutual’s case based on fraud, noting that Educators Mutual should 
have pursued its rights through a subrogation action, noting “It is well settled that an 
insurer may bring a cause of action on behalf of its insured.” Id. at 1031. The Educators 
Mutual Court then cited to both State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 450 P.2d 458 (Utah 1969)—a case where the insurance company brought its 
subrogation claim in its own name, not the name of its insured—and Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-21-108 (“Subrogation actions may be brought by the insurer in the name of its 
insured.”). Educators Mutual, 890 P.2d at 1031. The Utah Supreme Court did not 
indicate that the insurer had run afoul of either the real party in interest rule or standing 
rule by bringing the claim in its own name. 
 In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Northwestern National 
Insurance Co., State Farm brought a subrogation action in its own name to recoup monies 
State Farm paid after its insured was involved in an automobile accident. 912 P.2d 983 
(Utah 1996). The Utah Supreme Court explained, “Utah law clearly recognizes an 
insurer's right to bring a subrogation action on behalf of its insured against a tortfeasor [or 
the] insurance company which is primarily liable to . . . pay any claims on behalf of its 
insured.” Id. at 985 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108). The Utah Supreme Court 
never questioned whether State Farm was the real party in interest with standing to bring 
the action in its own name.  
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 Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. involved multiple insurance 
companies and the liability of each to defend and pay for environmental clean-up of an 
industrial site. 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997). Aetna cross-claimed in its own name against 
AMICO and Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, seeking subrogation and 
contribution for the defense costs it had paid. Id. at 131. Even though “an insurer's 
subrogation right is derivative of the rights of its insured,” id., the Utah Supreme Court 
did not require Aetna to seek subrogation in the name of its insured. Rather, the Court 
held that “Aetna has a valid cause of action for . . . subrogation.” Id. at 142. 
 Finally, consider the district court matter of AGCS Marine Ins. Co. v. Adler Hot 
Oil Serv. Inc., No. 150800020 (Utah 8th Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 26, 2015). (A copy of the 
docket and complaint for that matter are included as Addend. D). In that matter numerous 
insurers sued in their own names when asserting their subrogation rights, clearly showing 
that both insurers and the courts have long interpreted Utah law as allowing an insurance 
company to bring a subrogation action in either the name of the insurance company or the 
name of their insured.  
 Under Utah law, a subrogating insurer is, and has long been, a real party in interest 
in a subrogation claim. As “the real party in interest . . . the action could be commenced 
and maintained in its name.” Nat'l Union, 137 P. at 655. As Utah subrogation law 
evolved, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the insured could also be a real party in 
interest, or “co-owner” of the claim. See Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104. However, no case or 
statute has altered the long-standing rule that a subrogating insurer is a real party in 
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interest in a subrogation claim with the right to bring a subrogation action in its own 
name. 
C. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED JOHANSON V. 
CUDAHY. 
  
The Utah Court of Appeals relies primarily on the 1944 case, Johanson v. Cudahy 
Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98 (Utah 1944), to support its proposition that EMIA cannot bring 
a subrogation action in its own name. See Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ¶¶ 8–11, 368 P.3d 
471. Specifically, the court of appeals relies on the following language from Johanson: 
“‘it has been generally held that a suit at law to enforce a right of subrogation must, at 
common law, be brought in the name of the insured, rather than by the insurance 
company in its own name and right.’” Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 10, 368 P.3d 471 
(quoting Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104). This reliance on Johanson is misplaced primarily 
because the portion of Johanson quoted by the court of appeals is not the law the 
Johanson Court adopted; specifically, the Johanson Court first analyzed the different 
positions taken by other states (including the position quoted by the court of appeals) 
before adopting the completely contrary position that, under Utah law, both the insurer 
and insured are real parties in interest and both may bring the cause of action in their own 
name. Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104–105. 
Because the Johanson decision is so important to the court of appeal’s decision in 
this matter, this Brief will address in depth the analysis and holding of Johanson v. 
Cudahy Packing Company. This Brief will then individually address each instance in 
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which the court of appeals relied on Johanson. Finally, this Brief will show how the 
holding of Johanson supports EMIA’s position. 
1. Analysis and Holding of Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co. 
Johanson is a demurrer case in which the court was required to determine the 
parties’ rights to bring a wrongful death cause of action in accordance with Utah’s 1933 
worker’s compensation subrogation statute. Already established and accepted by the 
Johanson Court was the Utah rule that the subrogating insurer is a real party in interest 
with right to bring the claim in its own name. Id. at 100, 103–05. The primary question 
before the Johanson Court was whether the subrogating insurer is the sole party in 
interest or if the injured insured also retained a right to the claim and was also a party in 
interest. Id.  
The factual background to Johanson is as follows. Robert Johanson died in an 
industrial accident in 1938. Id. at 100. His parents applied for and were awarded 
industrial compensation for the death of their son in accordance with Utah’s worker’s 
compensation statute. Id. While the insurance carrier who paid the award could have 
brought a subrogation action against defendants in its own name, the insurer waived its 
right to bring the action. Id. at 104. Johanson’s parents then brought a wrongful death 
cause of action themselves in their own names. Id. The defendant tortfeasor argued that, 
because the parents received a compensation award from the insurer, the insurer was the 
sole party in interest and the Johansons “are not the proper parties to bring this action.” 
Id. at 102. Defendants argued that only the subrogating insurer who had paid the award 
could bring the claim. Id.  
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At the time of the Johanson decision, there were three primary views the different 
states had adopted concerning in whose name a subrogation action should be brought. See 
Michael C. Ferguson, The Real Party in Interest Rule Revitalized: Recognizing 
Defendant’s Interest in the Determination of Proper Parties Plaintiff, 55 CAL. L. REV. 
1452, 1479–80 (1967), http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
2841&context=californialawreview. The first view was that “actions on subrogated 
claims must be prosecuted by the subrogee [insurer] alone.” Id. The second view was that 
“such actions [must] be prosecuted by the subrogor [insured] alone.” Id. at 1480. The 
final view was that “either the subrogor or the subrogee [may] prosecute such actions.” 
Id. In analyzing the issue of whether or not an injured insured is a real party in interest, 
the Johanson Court reviewed other jurisdictions’ rulings to see how other states had 
addressed this issue, Johanson, 152 P.2d at 102–05, and the Johanson Court examined all 
three of the above views. Id.  
The first view, that the subrogee/insurer alone was the real party in interest, was 
embraced by Justice McDonough in the dissenting opinion. Id. at 110–111 (J. 
McDonough, dissenting). Justice McDonough opined that an insurer’s subrogation rights 
result in “giving control of the cause of action [to the] insurance carrier. It results in the    
. . . insurance carrier becoming the real party in interest . . . . The election by the 
employee [to accept compensation from the insurer] divests him of any legal interest in 
the cause of action.” Id. at 110 (J. McDonough, dissenting). The Johanson Court did not 
adopt this view. 
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The second view, that the subrogor/insured was the sole party in interest, was 
analyzed but not adopted in the majority opinion. Id. at 103–04. The Johanson Court 
noted that cases from several states support this rule. Id. at 103.  
These cases proceed upon the theory that the insured is the trustee for the 
insurer and that the third party has a right not to have the cause of action 
against him split up so that he is compelled to defend two or more actions. 
This splitting of the cause of action is avoided by having the suit brought in 
the name of the insured for the benefit of himself and as trustee for the 
insurance carrier. 
 
Id. at 103–04. Under this rule, the Johanson Court noted “it has been generally held that a 
suit at law to enforce such right of subrogation must, at common law, be brought in the 
name of the insured, rather than by the insurance company in its own name and right.” Id. 
at 104. While this view was contrary to Utah’s precedence (that a subrogating insurer is 
the real party in interest in a subrogation claim, see Baker v. Wycoff, 79 P.2d 77, 81 (Utah 
1938); Nat'l Union, 137 P. at 655), analysis of this view supported the Johanson Court’s 
final holding that the insured should maintain at least some rights to the cause of action. 
 The view adopted by the Johanson Court was that both the subrogor and the 
subrogee are real parties in interest. Johanson, P.2d at 105. This view was analyzed at 
Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104–105. The Johanson Court began this line of analysis stating, 
“There are cases holding that under statutes similar to Utah statutes relating to proper and 
necessary parties plaintiff both the insured and the insurance carrier must be joined.” Id. 
at 104. In support of this view, the Johanson Court stated, “insurers which, by 
subrogation, are equitable assignees . . . not only are proper parties plaintiff, but must be 
joined as such.” Id. at 104 (quoting 96 A.L.R. 884–89). Under the view adopted by the 
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Johanson Court, both the insured and insurer were “co-owners of the insured’s right of 
action.” Id. at 104.  
 In applying this view to the facts of the case, the Johanson Court held, “When the 
insurance carrier declined to bring its action and executed a waiver thereof, the 
dependents were not compelled to forego suit. They have an interest in the recovery and 
can bring suit to enforce it.” Id. at 104. The supreme court continued, “The failure on the 
part of the plaintiffs to make the [missing party] a party plaintiff, or if it refused to join, 
make it a party defendant, is at the most a defect in parties plaintiff. Such a defect is 
waived unless raised.” Id. at 104–05. The rule adopted by the Johanson Court is that both 
the insurer and insured are real parties in interest. Id. Both parties should be joined as 
parties plaintiff. Id. If one of the parties is not joined, “the defendant, by making timely 
objection, could have had the [missing party] made a party.” Id. at 107. Failure to join the 
missing party is a defect that, unless raised, is waived. Id. at 104–05.  
2. The Court of Appeals Misapplied Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co. 
The court of appeals misapplied the ruling in Johanson. It took one view analyzed 
by the Johanson Court and incorrectly applied that view as Utah law. This mistake is 
completely at odds with the actual holding in Johanson, is inconsistent with the 
development of Utah’s subrogation law prior to Johanson, and ignores the development 
of subrogation case law subsequent to Johanson. See, e.g., Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997) (allowing insurer to bring subrogation claim 
in own name); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nw. Nat. Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 983 (Utah 
1996) (same); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 505 P.2d 783 (Utah 1972) (same); State 
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Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 450 P.2d 458 (Utah 1969) (same); Nat'l 
Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Grp., 377 P.2d 786 (Utah 1963) 
(same). 
The court of appeals’ primary application of Johanson was to cite Johanson’s 
analysis of the subrogor/insured as sole party in interest view, a view not adopted by the 
Johanson Court. Under this rejected view, “‘it has been generally held that a suit at law to 
enforce a right of subrogation must, at common law, be brought in the name of the 
insured, rather than by the insurance company in its own name and right.’” Wilson, 2016 
UT App 38, ¶ 10, 368 P.3d 471 (quoting Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104). However, the 
Johanson Court rejected this view. Instead, the Johanson Court adopted the view that 
both the insurer and insured are real parties in interest, both are co-owners of the claim, 
and both may bring the action in their own name. Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104–105. 
 The court of appeals cited Johanson for the policy concern that allowing “an 
insurer to sue in its own name, except where it has fully indemnified the insured, could 
compel the wrongdoer to ‘defend a multitude of suits’ against multiple insurance 
companies, the insured, and/or the insured’s dependents or heirs.” Wilson, 2016 UT App 
38, ¶¶ 10, 12 n.6, 368 P.3d 471 (citing Johanson, 152 P.2d at 103). However, the 
Johanson Court addressed how this concern is resolved under the rule adopted by Utah. 
Specifically, the Johanson Court concluded that under the Utah rule (both insured and 
insurer are real parties in interest), the multiple suits problem is solved through joinder. 
There is but a single cause of action involved . . . . That the insurers as 
equitable assignees of the insured are interested therein to the extent of their 
payment to the insured . . . does not create other causes of action, legal or 
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equitable, against defendants. It is still one cause of action, a single 
controversy, owned in common by the insured and the insurers. . . . The 
plaintiffs herein, co-owners of the insured’s right of action, were not only 
authorized by the state law to sue jointly as they did, but were compelled to 
do so. One compelled to join and joined in an action, and having a 
substantial interest therin, is not a nominal, but a necessary or indispensable 
party. 
 
Id. at 104. The supreme court explained how joinder protects a defendant against multiple 
suits. “The one and only interest of [defendant] is that the suit be brought in the names of 
those interested in it so that he will not later be made to defend a second suit for the same 
wrong.” Id. at 107. The supreme court explained that this “protection [against multiple 
suits] is insured here by the fact that the defendant, by making timely objection, could 
have had the [missing party] made a party.” Id. at 107. Should the missing party not be 
joined, that “is at the most a defect in parties plaintiff. Such a defect is waived unless 
raised.” Id. at 105. The multiple suits problem highlighted by the court of appeals is 
solved, under Utah law, through joinder. 
 Finally, the court of appeals notes that in workers’ compensation cases such as 
Johanson, the legislature has granted explicit rights to the subrogating insurer, including 
“expressly grant[ing] insurers . . . the authority to bring such actions in their own names,” 
Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 8 n.4, 368 P.3d 471, and “expressly provid[ing] that the 
insurer is to be reimbursed before the employee or the employee’s heirs.” Id. ¶ 11 n.5. 
While both of these rights do appear in current day statutes, neither right was expressly 
granted in the 1933 version of the statute interpreted by the Johanson Court. Rather, the 
Johanson Court relied on “general principles of subrogation as affected by statutes 
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governing pleading”—rather than express statutory language—in holding that both the 
insurer and insured are real parties in interest. Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104 (“when . . . no 
special rules for maintaining the [subrogation] action are prescribed, the proceeding to 
enforce the rights gained by subrogation will be controlled by general principles of 
subrogation as affected by statutes governing pleading.”). 
3. The Holding of Johanson Supports EMIA’s Position. 
Under Johanson’s holding, both EMIA and Jessica Wilson (or Ms. Wilson’s 
estate) are real parties in interest in this suit. Either may maintain the action in their own 
name. To protect himself from multiple suits, the defendant could have had Ms. Wilson’s 
estate made a party to the proceedings. However, no party sought to have Ms. Wilson’s 
estate joined in these proceedings. Failure to join Ms. Wilson’s estate “is at the most a 
defect in parties plaintiff. Such a defect is waived unless raised.” Johanson, 152 P.2d at 
105. It is important to note that the parties at the trial court level did consolidate the 
wrongful death proceeding with the subrogation proceeding. As such, consolidation 
provided the defendant with protection from multiple suits in this matter. 
The court of appeals misapplied Johanson by relying on language that the 
Johanson Court did not adopt as Utah law. The actual holding of Johanson, that both the 
insurer and insured are real parties in interest and both may bring the cause of action in 
their own name, Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104–105, supports EMIA’s position. EMIA is a 
real party in interest and may maintain a subrogation action in its own name. 
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D. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS CREATED A REQUIREMENT THAT 
WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR AN INSURER TO RECOVER IN 
INSTANCES WHERE AN INSURED PASSES AWAY FROM THE 
ACTIONS OR INACTIONS OF A TORTFEASOR. 
   
 Near the conclusion of its opinion, the court of appeals stated, “EMIA should have 
brought its personal injury action in the name of the estate . . . .” Wilson, 2016 UT App 
38, ¶ 12, 368 P.3d 471. However, such a requirement ignores § 31A-21-108 and Utah 
case law which allows an insurer to bring a subrogation action in its own name, and is 
untenable for two reasons. First, it creates a situation where an insurer would have to 
initiate a probate proceeding and hope for the assistance of a personal representative who 
would likely be unwilling to aid the insurer in its efforts to receive reimbursement; and 
second, the requirement runs contrary to rules of statutory interpretation. 
First, by requiring an insurer to bring an action in the name of the estate of its 
insured, the court of appeals has created a situation where an insurer will likely never be 
able to recover if its insured passes away as a result of injuries sustained by the actions or 
inactions of a third party. Utah code states in regard to survival actions 
A cause of action arising out of personal injury to a person, or death caused 
by the wrongful act or negligence of a wrongdoer, does not abate upon the 
death of the wrongdoer or the injured person. The injured person, or the 
personal representatives or heirs of the person who died, has a cause of 
action against the wrongdoer or the personal representatives of the 
wrongdoer.  
 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-107 (emphasis added). Given the language of § 78B-3-107, 
which only allows a survival action to be brought by the injured person, personal 
representative, or heirs of the deceased, and the court of appeals’ reasoning, an insurer 
would be required to initiate a probate proceeding and pursue its claims with the 
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assistance of a personal representative who would likely be a family member of the 
deceased. If the present matter illustrates anything it is that the interests of the family of a 
deceased individual and that of the insurer are often conflicted. A personal representative 
or family member would have little incentive to assist an insurer if doing so would 
potentially reduce the amount of assets or funds available for the person acting as 
personal representative, or other family members, to receive. Creating such a requirement 
was unnecessary given § 31A-21-108 allows an insurer to bring a subrogation action in 
its own name.   
Second, requiring an insurer to sue in the name of the estate of its insured runs 
contrary to normal rules of statutory interpretation. The Utah Supreme Court has stated in 
regard to statutory interpretation, there is a “general rule that [the court] should construe 
statutory provisions so as to give full effect to all their terms, where possible.” Schurtz v. 
BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991). Further, “[w]hen 
interpreting statutes, we look first to the statute’s plain language with the primary 
objective of giving effect to the legislature's intent.” Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 
2007 UT 42, ¶ 46, 164 P.3d 384. Also, “‘[w]e presume that the legislature used each 
word advisedly’ and read ‘each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.’”  
Id. (quoting State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶ 29, 127 P.3d 682). Finally, “[s]tatutes should 
be read as a whole and their provisions interpreted in harmony with related provisions 
and statutes.” Martinez, 2007 UT 42, ¶ 46, 164 P.3d 384. The approach utilized by the 
court of appeals ignores Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108, and allows § 78B-3-107 to 
nullify, or swallow, § 31A-21-108. Such an approach runs contrary to the requirement 
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that “[s]tatutes should be read as a whole and their provisions interpreted in harmony 
with related provisions and statutes.” Martinez, 2007 UT 42, ¶ 46, 164 P.3d 384.  
Another approach, which would have given full effect to § 31A-21-108 and § 78B-3-107, 
would have been to allow an insurer to recover those damages pertaining to its 
subrogation claim, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108, while allowing heirs to 
recover those damages available pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-107, as the 
damages that each respective party would be entitled to differ.      
E. THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED POLICY IMPLICATIONS. 
The court of appeals has also failed to consider serious policy implications. First, 
as was noted above, it is unlikely insurers will receive reimbursement if an insured passes 
away because of the actions or inactions of a third-party tortfeasor if an insurer cannot 
bring a subrogation action in its own name. In order to protect their interests, insurers will 
likely add language to their policies excluding coverage for injuries sustained by an 
insured that were caused by a third-party, if the insured subsequently passes away as a 
result of the injuries sustained. This would inappropriately shift the financial burden from 
the tortfeasor to the family of the insured and/or medical providers. Simply put, the Utah 
Court of Appeals’ opinion disincentivizes insurers providing coverage for most 
catastrophic accidents.  
 Second, even if insurers do not add exclusionary language to their policies, it is 
likely that insurance premiums will increase substantially. When actuaries for insurance 
companies determine premiums for insurance policies they generally take into account 
the right of the insurer to subrogate against a tortfeasor who has caused the injuries of its 
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insured. If an insurer is effectively barred from maintaining a subrogation action because 
the insured has died as a result of the injuries sustained, premium rates would increase 
since there would be no hope for reimbursement. This is unfair to insureds who would be 
forced to bear the burden of increased premiums.  
 Finally, there are instances where it makes good sense procedurally to allow 
insurers to bring subrogation actions in their own names. This is especially true in multi-
party actions. In those cases there may be multiple insurers seeking subrogation, and 
Plaintiffs seeking redress for tort claims. All of the parties would potentially be suing 
under the same name. For example, in matters like AGCS Marine Ins. Co. v. Adler Hot 
Oil Serv. Inc., No. 150800020 (Utah 8th Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 26, 2015), where there are 
several parties involved, forcing the insurers to sue in the names of their insureds creates 
confusion and an organizational nightmare for the district court. All of which is avoided 
by simply allowing insurers to bring their subrogation actions in their own names.    
F. HILL AND CEDERLOFF DO NOT STAND FOR THE PROPOSITION 
THAT AN HEIR HAS A SUPERIOR RIGHT TO RECOVER IN A 
PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM.  
 
 In footnote 6 of its opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals states  
EMIA asserts that the correct approach would be to allow the insurer and 
the heirs to pursue separate claims to recover their respective shares of 
damages arising from a personal injury claim. Such an approach would . . . 
potentially compromise the heirs’ superior right to recover their share of 
the personal injury claim, see Hill [v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 765 
P.2d 864, 866 (Utah 1988)]. See Cederloff v. Whited, 169 P.2d 777, 780 
(Utah 1946). 
 
Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 12 n.6, 368 P.3d 471 (emphasis added). However, neither 
Hill nor Cederloff stand for the proposition that heirs have a superior right of recovery.  
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The portion of Hill cited to by the Utah Court of Appeals provides a factual 
background; the general principle that “Subrogation is an equitable doctrine . . . . [which] 
can be modified by contract”; and the obstacles associated with determining whether or 
not an insured has been made whole by a settlement when equitable subrogation 
principles apply rather than contractual principles. 765 P.2d at 866.3 Hill simply does not 
state that heirs have a superior right to recovery.  
In regard to Cederloff, that matter did not deal with wrongful death heirs, nor did it 
address the issue of priority of recovery between heirs and a subrogated insurer. Instead, 
the Utah Supreme Court considered whether or not an insured who had received 
insurance proceeds could maintain an action in the insured’s name for amounts that had 
been paid by the insurer in behalf of the insured. Cederloff, 169 P.2d at 777–78. 
Therefore, similar to Hill, Cederloff does not stand for the proposition that heirs have a 
superior right to recovery over an insurer.   
II. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED RULE 17 OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE INCORRECTLY.  
 
 Even if the Utah Court of Appeals correctly interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 31A-
21-108, it misapplied Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 17 states 
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the 
name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed 
after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder 
or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or 
                                              
3
 It should be noted that EMIA was subrogating in accordance with the contractual terms 
contained in its insurance policy with Jessica Wilson. As such, much of the doctrine 
contained in Hill is inapplicable as the Hill Court applied equitable principles of 
subrogation in that matter. See Hill, 765 P.2d at 867.   
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substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced 
in the name of the real party in interest. 
 
U.R.C.P. 17(a). (emphasis added).  
Despite the clear language in Rule 17, in its opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals 
stated, “We conclude that EMIA lacked standing to pursue a subrogation action against 
Krueger in its own name. Thus, the trial court erred in dividing the Wilsons’ settlement 
with EMIA. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand with instructions 
for the trial court to dismiss EMIA’s claims . . . .” Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ¶ 13, 368 
P.3d 471. (emphasis added). EMIA’s ability to bring a subrogation action in its own 
name is not a standing issue, rather a real party in interest issue governed by Rule 17, 
making dismissal inappropriate. While EMIA believes that it was proper to bring its 
subrogation action in its own name, even if it could not, EMIA would have had standing 
had it brought its subrogation action in the name of its insured. See Wilson, 2016 UT App 
38, ¶ 12, 368 P.3d 471 (“EMIA should have brought its personal injury action in the 
name of the estate or intervened in the Wilsons’ action against Krueger.”). Therefore, 
pursuant to Rule 17, the Utah Court of Appeals should not have ordered that EMIA’s 
claims be dismissed.  
The problem with this remedy is illustrated in AGCS Marine Ins. Co. v. Adler Hot 
Oil Serv. Inc., No. 150800020 (Utah 8th Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 26, 2015). In that matter 
several insurers sued in their own names when asserting their subrogation rights. Shortly 
after the Wilson opinion was entered, the insurers in that matter immediately filed 
motions to change the named party in interest to their insureds. However, the holding of 
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Wilson may not allow for that change, but may require dismissal of the subrogating 
insurers’ actions. Such a result is unfair and inappropriate pursuant to Rule 17.  
Because EMIA’s ability to bring a subrogation action in its own name is not a 
standing issue, rather a real party in interest issue governed by Rule 17, dismissal was 
inappropriate.    
CONCLUSION 
 Because EMIA had standing to bring its action in its own name, the decision of the 
Utah Court of Appeals should be reversed. Further, even if § 31A-21-108 does not give 
EMIA standing to bring an action in its own name, the court of appeals’ decision 
requiring the trial court to dismiss EMIA’s action should be reversed as it is contrary to 
Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.  
 
 
DATED this 30th day of August, 2016. 
 
      /s/ Jeffrey A. Callister_____________  
         Randall R. Smart 
         Jeffrey A. Callister 
         Attorneys for Petitioner 
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